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SOFT LAW: THE OPTIMAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION
Yussuf A Aleem *
ABSTRACT
The regulation of global finance comprises an unorthodox legal framework.
Unlike other areas of economic regulation or international law, more generally,
this framework is not directed through intergovernmental organizations with
formal legal status. Moreover, commitments (or best practice standards) made
by various regulatory officials are non-binding and subject to significant
variation. This departure is especially unique when comparing financial
regulation to areas such as international trade law or environmental law. 1
The purpose of this Paper is to provide a positive analysis explaining the
prevalence of this form of “soft” law, and normatively suggest why such a
framework is the optimal form of regulation in this arena. In doing so, I first
explain the need for financial regulation, the transboundary nature of financial
systems, and other unique features endemic to global finance, including the need
to account for dynamism, complexity and sovereignty considerations. I compare
the financial regulatory framework to the formal treaty-making process used in
international environmental law as well as the experiences of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). I then address certain criticisms of the current regulatory
framework and identify areas where there may be room for improvement,
including enhanced administrative law mechanisms and increased participation
from the Global South.

*
Yussuf A Aleem is a graduate of Harvard Law School (J.D.), where he was a member of the Harvard
Legal Aid Bureau during his 2L year. He also holds an LL.M from Columbia Law School, where he specialized
in international law and was named a James Kent Scholar.
The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their contributions and support:
Professor Vijay Tata, Jocelyn Kirsch, Jacob Slowik, Tarek Abdel-aleem, Mehdi Eddebbarh, and Mohamad
Ahmad.
1
This Paper contrasts the global financial regulatory experience to that of international environmental
law for several reasons. First, both areas of regulation are transboundary in nature. Climate change, like financial
contagion, does not stop at a national border. International environmental law is also a developed area of law—
there are thousands of bilateral and multilateral treaties. This Paper also compares global financial regulation to
the experiences of international trade law. This comparison is useful considering that both domains concern
economic policy as well as the WTO’s oft-mentioned dispute mechanism system.
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THE NEED FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION AND AN INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK

A. The Critical Functions of Financial Systems
As a threshold matter, one may ask why any regulation over financial
systems, whether in the form of a hard or soft law framework, is necessary in
the first place. Virtually all economists today view the financial sector as having
a critical function in facilitating economic growth. 2 Financial systems promote
the most efficient allocation of resources by: providing for the mobilization of
savings, the facilitation of payments and trade of goods and services, project
2
See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, 26 (1st ed. 2016) (“. . . the better
view is that development in the financial system is causally important for economic growth”).
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selection and monitoring of investments, and the sharing of investment
information, as well as several other key initiatives beyond the scope of this
paper. 3 Armour et al. idyllically note that the pareto-optimal property of
competitive markets is an “almost magical feature.” 4 Economists likewise refer
to the “magic” of the transformative function of fractional reserve banking. 5
Moreover, some scholars have posited that financial systems, both indirectly and
through enhanced access to markets, contribute to poverty reduction. 6
Excessive financial regulation risks defeating the very functions that
financial systems are designed to serve. Excessive regulation is generally
understood to increase costs and often forces regulators to make difficult
decisions involving trade-offs. For example, measures that limit credit booms
may have negative consequences for economic output and employment. 7
Onerous prudential measures can induce a reduction in credit supply, which in
turn may encourage banks to take on higher risk, potentially undermining
financial stability. 8 Investor and consumer protection may also conflict with
financial stability by reducing diversity in the financial system, which in turn
may reduce its resilience to systemic shocks. 9
B. Systemic Risk and System Shock
Notwithstanding the foregoing challenges, financial crises and their
aftermaths provide us with a better understanding of these critical economic
functions. When left unchecked, these functions have a notable Achilles’ heel:
they expose the inherent fragility of financial systems, and therefore present
risks of systemic failure and potentially severe economic costs. 10 In economic
terms, financial regulation exists precisely because of market imperfections and
the negative externalities financial institutions impose on society. 11 According
to research by Lavean and Valencia, banking crises since 1970 have resulted in
Id. at 24.
Id. at 54.
5
See PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, (Univ. of Minn. Libraries Publ’g, 2011) (ebook) https://open.lib.umn.
edu/principleseconomics/chapter/24-2-the-banking-system-and-money-creation/.
6
See Juzhong Zhuang et al., Financial Sector Development, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction:
A Literature Review 1–9 (ADB Economic Working Paper, No. 173, 2009).
7
See XAVIER FREIXAS ET AL., SYSTEMIC RISK, CRISES, AND MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION, 266
(2015).
8
Id.
9
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 71.
10
Id. at 51 (“Particular features of free markets make them especially prone to malfunction . . . in the case
of finance, the consequence of actions may not be revealed for extended periods of time, perhaps even years or
decades, then the potential for failure and the complexities of correcting it are much greater.”).
11
See FREIXAS ET AL., supra note 8, at 203.
3
4

ALEEM_6.9.22

4

6/13/2022 2:52 PM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol. 9

average output losses of 30.1 percent of GDP, with average increases in public
debt in the amount of 26 percent of GDP. 12 For example, during the 2007-08
global financial crisis, the aftermaths quantified and realized in 2016 by the
crisis had cost the United States 15 percent of GDP, or $4.6 trillion. A 2018
study by the Federal Reserve Board found that the crisis cost every single
American a staggering $70,000, on average. 13 In addition to market
imperfections and efficiency considerations, it should be emphasized that the
failure of financial systems generates significant and adverse distributional
effects. During the aforementioned global financial crisis, for instance, lowincome earners suffered significantly more than high-income earners in terms of
job prospects. 14 Moreover, some research has suggested that the financial crisis
created a significant sector of “newly poor” households in certain middleincome nations from an exacerbated middle class. 15 Such increases in poverty
and inequality should raise additional questions of fairness when one considers
regulatory actions that socialize losses, namely bank bailouts. 16 Finally,
recovery from economic crises, which are marked by severe economic
downturn, is far more difficult than recovery from ordinary business cycle
recessions. 17
For these reasons, and others discussed in more detail below, financial
regulation aims not just to regulate certain conduct (e.g., investor, consumer
protection) but also, (and more importantly) to prevent systemic risk. 18 Prior to
the 2008 global financial crisis, it was thought that banks’ overall risk-taking
and propensity for contagion could be managed effectively by microprudential
regulation, including capital adequacy rules as well as certain ex post

12
Id. at 144 (citing Luc Lavean and Fabian Valencia, System Crisis Banking Revisited 206 (IMF Working
Paper No. 18, 2018)).
13
See Gautam Makunda, The Social and Political Costs of the Financial Crisis, 10 Years Later, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Sept. 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/the-social-and-political-costs-of-the-financial-crisis-10-yearslater.
14
See Ippei Shibata, The Distributional Impacts of Recessions: The Global Financial Crisis and the
Pandemic Recession 96 (IMF Working Paper No. 20, 2020).
15
See Bilal Habib et al., The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Poverty and Income Distribution: Insights
from Simulations in Selected Countries, 7 THE ECONOMIC PREMISE (WORLD BANK) (Mar. 2010), https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/10206/537450BRI0EP70Box345626B01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1&i
sAllowed=y.
16
See Paul Krugman, Bailouts for Bunglers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/
02/02/opinion/02krugman.html. The Federal Reserve’s decision to “bail out” Bear Stearns but allow Lehman
Brothers to collapse has been a hotly debated subject.
17
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 409.
18
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 73 (describing the various goals and strategies of financial
regulation, such as governance, insurance and resolution; see also Llewellyn, infra note 24, at 14–15 (discussing
regulatory matrix of prudential regulation, systemic regulation, conduct and competition).
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mechanisms, such as deposit insurance and resort to lender of last resort
(“LOLR”) facilities. The global financial crisis belied these assumptions.
Accordingly, following the financial crisis, the regulatory and supervisory
framework has shifted its focus from microprudential tools, ensuring the safety
and soundness of individual institutions, to macroprudential regulation. 19
C. Macroprudential Approach to Regulation
Following the global financial crisis, macroprudential tools, including crosssectional and time-varying measures (e.g., countercyclical capital buffers and
other liquidity requirements) have been implemented to prevent and manage
various forms of risk to the system as a whole, taking into account the various
interlinkages that can create feedback and spillover effects. 20 It is important to
emphasize that as a result of the global financial crisis we have learned that a
particular financial intermediary does not have to fail for a systemic shock to be
triggered. In other words, macroprudential mechanisms recognize that a shock
can be transmitted through interlinking investment strategies. 21 To this end, in
2009, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (“Basel Comittee”) and
the Financial Stability Forum (which later became the Financial Stability Board,
or “FSB”) produced proposals for new measures as part of Basel III. 22 Basel
III, among other measures, introduced certain liquidity requirements, increased
minimum capital requirements, and a non-risk-based leverage ratio. These
standards are discussed in greater detail below.
To summarize, financial regulation, despite its potential drawbacks and
inefficiencies, is essential to prevent and contain systemic risks. Specifically,
since the global financial crisis, measures of macroprudential policy have been
implemented to prevent (ex ante) and contain systemic risks given the severe
costs that financial shocks impose. These costs often have a disproportionate and
negative impact on the most vulnerable members of society. 23

See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 409.
See FREIXAS ET AL., supra note 8, at 251–90 (noting that distributional consequences of
macroprudential policy and its impact on inequality, both ex ante and ex post, is an important issue for systemic
risk); [see also] Joel P. Trachtman, The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity,
Fragmentation and Cooperation, 13 J. OF INT’L ECON. L., 719, [X] (2010).
21
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 65.
22
See id. at 409.
23
See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.
J. 1405, 1461 (2013) (“As a result of GFC, controlling systemic risk (and moral hazard) has become the central
focus of financial regulation.”).
19
20
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D. The Transboundary Nature of Global Finance and Systemic Risk
Why then is an international regulatory framework necessary? After all,
most nations nine (particularly in the developed world) have elaborate (and
diverse) domestic regulatory and supervisory architectures to address the
foregoing concerns and related matters of macroeconomic policy described in
this paper. 24 The answer lies, in part, on the impact of globalization on financial
systems and the consequential growth of interlinkages among these systems. 25
The scale of international flows of capital across borders has significantly
increased over the last several decades, especially as a result of pro-liberalization
efforts to embrace global trade in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the
preeminence of the US dollar as the primary currency of the International
Reserve. Recent cross-listings of securities, particularly bond financing on US
exchanges, have further increased transboundary capital flows. 26 Technological
developments in information and communication (namely the internet) have also
further facilitated financial transactions across borders. Moreover, institutions
have become increasingly global in their operations. 27 According to Tooze,
“what drives global trade are not the relationships between national economies
but multinational corporations coordinating far-flung ‘value chains.’” 28
Consequentialy, in 2011 the FSB developed a policy framework to address the
systemic and moral hazard risks associated with systemically important financial
institutions. 29 Moreover, one of the main focuses of the Basel III guidance was
to introduce capital surcharges for global systemically important financial
institutions (or “G-SIFI”s). 30

24
See generally David Llewellyn, Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The
Basic Issues, World Bank Seminar: Aligning Supervisory Structures with Country Needs in Washington DC
(June 6–7, 2006) (addressing regulatory architecture and the criteria to assess the optimality of institutional
structure); See also ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 597.
25
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 44; see also Galbraith and Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations
Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 737 (“In the wake of the financial crisis, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board (the Fed) acknowledged that ‘the world is too interconnected for nations to go it alone in their economic,
financial, and regulatory policies.’); see also Joseph J. Norton, International Financial Law, an Increasingly
Important Component of International Economic Law, (internal quotations omitted) 20 MICH. J. INT’L. 133
(1999).
26
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 3, at 45.
27
Id. at 46.
28
Adam Tooze, RETHINKING THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS (excerpt), NATIONAL POST (2019), https://
nationalpost.com/opinion/adam-tooze-book-excerpt-rethinking-the-2008-financial-crisis.
29
See FIN. STABILITY BD., Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions at
1, 4 (Nov. 4, 2011), https://www.fsb.org/2011/11/r_111104bb/.
30
See Verdier, supra note 24 at 1439. (“ . . . as financial firms become global and their structure becomes
more complex, supervising them internationally becomes more challenging. Without some coordination and
allocation of responsibility among national authorities, some firms may avoid effective regulation altogether.”).
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It should be no surprise then that financial shocks in one country can quickly
spread to markets and institutions across the globe. 31 The global financial crisis
and fall of Lehman Brothers, a U.S.-based investment bank, is often cited as a
contributing factor to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 32 Fearing the
imminent failure of financial institutions and a credit freeze on short-term
funding, European governments borrowed funds to bail out financial
institutions, which in turn threatened the solvency of some of those
governments. As Armour et al. succinctly put it, “contagion does not stop at
national boundaries.” 33 As such, international coordination and cooperation is
necessary to ensure that information is shared among regulators, that there is
consistency among regulation, and that action in one nation does not have
unanticipated cross-border effects in another. 34 Given the transboundary nature
of financial systems and growing significance of G-SIFIs, consistency across
regulators is vital to mitigate regulatory arbitrage, whereby firms attempt to
capitalize on weaknesses or gaps in a particular financial system to evade
unfavorable regulations at home. In summary, the international coordination of
financial regulation is required to address problems posed by a productive but
risky industry that spreads both its benefits and risks across borders. 35
II. SOFT LAW IN THE GLOBAL FINANCE CONTEXT
A. What Is Soft Law?
Soft law is an informal label that generally refers to non-binding regulatory
principles or commitments. Soft law stands in opposition to “hard” obligations
found in formal legal instruments between or among nations, such as a treaty,
protocol or convention. 36 Soft law has been described as an “experiment in
global governance” to see whether a successful architecture of international
regulations could be created without the formal use of treaties, diplomats, or
31
Galbraith and Zaring, supra note 26, at 793 (“Now that the world is truly flat, financial crises are
evidently contagious, and global warming cares not for national borders, it is naive to hope that regulators can
meet their regulatory missions without cooperating with their foreign counterparts.”).
32
Id. at 47.
33
Id. at 407.
34
Id.
35
See David Zaring, Legal Obligation in International Law and International Finance, 48 Cornell Int’l
L. J. 1, 178 (2015).
36
See Vivienne Bath and Luke Nottage, International Investment Agreements and Investor-State
Arbitration in Asia, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 571 (J. Chaisse et al.
eds.,2020) (soft law “describes a set of rules which are made by international standard-setting bodies and not
adopted in legally binding forms. Those non-binding rules appear in the form of ‘principles’, ‘guidelines’,
‘memorandum of understanding’ (MOU), best practices, etc.”).
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state custom. 37 In this sense, some have even reasoned that soft law is (at least
as a technical matter) not even law at all. 38
Most sources of global financial regulation are developed by informal, nongovernmental institutions that set standards (and agendas) for the international
regulatory community. 39 These institutions, aside from the IMF and World
Bank, 40 generally do not have a treaty mandate. 41 Coordination is led by central
banks, regulatory agencies and supervisors, and finance ministers. 42 The best
known among these groups are the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
and the FSB, the International Organization on Securities Commissions
(“IOSCO”), and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(“IAIS”). 43 Global financial regulation also comes in multiple species of soft
law. Soft law often takes the form of best practices, standards, or principles that
promote sound regulatory supervision. The “Core Principles” of regulation set
by the Basel Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS are generally considered the most
important of these standards. 44 The “Key Attributes” set by the FSB form
another critical element of policy standards. Adopted by the G20 in the wake of
the global financial crisis, these measures outline resolution regimes to address
G-SIFIs that were once thought to be “too big to fail.” 45 Regulatory reports and
observations (the data collected, shared, and utilized by national regulators), as
well as memorandums of understanding among regulators form another
important aspect of the global financial regulatory framework.

Zaring, supra note 36, at 176.
See Id.; see also Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance – Not Trade, 13 J
Int’l Econ. L. 631 (2010).
39
Id. at 627.
40
The IMF and World Bank generally do not create regulatory standards, even though they can serve as
monitors of regulatory activity.
See Adam Feibelman, Law in the Global Order: The IMF and Financial Regulation, 49 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L.
& POL. (2017) (Discussion on the treaty mandate and hard law nature of the IMF); see Hassane Cisse,
Alternatives to ‘Hard’ Law in International Financial Regulation: The Experience of the World Bank,
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 106 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L., 317–20 (2012) (Discussion on the positive
experiences the World Bank has had with soft law,).
41
While the WTO, discussed infra, has a treaty mandate, only one of its commitments touches on
financial services, the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), which relates to the treatment of
foreign investment by national authorities, and is not prudential in nature. Brummer, infra note 68, at 627.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 628–29
45
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, FSB Key Attributes–Executive Summary (May 29, 2019),
https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsisummaries/fsb_key_attributes.htm.
37
38
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B. Soft Law in Action: The Basel Standards
There is perhaps no greater example of soft law in action then the Basel
Standards, the signature achievement of global financial regulation. 46 The Basel
Standards were not promulgated through a process coordinated by an established
international organization such as the United Nations or IMF, but rather through
a series of informal meetings among various banking regulators from Europe,
the United States, and a small number of other countries. 47 As mentioned earlier,
Basel III was developed in response to the deficiencies in financial regulation
revealed by the global financial crisis and intends to provide a foundation for a
resilient banking system that avoids the accumulation of systemic
vulnerabilities. 48 Specifically, Basel III aims to strengthen bank capital
requirements (generally, to 4.5 percent of common equity from 2 percent under
Basel II, calling for an additional 2.5 percent buffer requirement), increase bank
liquidity (it provides two liquidity ratios—the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the
Net Stable Funding Ratio), and decrease bank leverage (it provides a non-riskbased leverage ratio to serve as a backstop). 49 Despite such an important (and
perhaps ambitious) scope of regulatory coverage, the Basel Committee has
repeatedly reinforced that “its conclusions do not have, and were never intended
to have, legal force.” 50
C. The Blurred Line Between Soft and Hard Law
The formal distinction between soft and hard law is perhaps in many respects
much ado about nothing. Soft law in the global finance context, according to
Zaring, has “more similarities to hard law then one might expect, given that the
concepts were conceived as opposites.” 51 Indeed, global financial regulation
shares many similarities to public international law, the latter of which “creates
a great deal of its necessarily fuzzy content through contestation . . . .” 52 Such
“fuzziness” is particularly manifest in the case of customary international law,
which obliges states to binding legal obligations in absence of an explicit treaty
or contractual commitment. 53 Moreover, public international law, as with global
Zaring, supra note 36, at 206.
Galbraith and Zaring, supra note 26, at 735.
48
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, High Level Summary on Basel III Reforms (Dec. 2017),
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf.
49
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity
risk monitoring tools (Jan. 2013), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf.
50
Zaring, supra note 36, at 181.
51
Zaring, supra note 36, at 251.
52
Id. at 181.
53
Id. at 183.
46
47

ALEEM_6.9.22

10

6/13/2022 2:52 PM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol. 9

financial regulation, ultimately depends on domestic enforcement for its
legitimization. Some have even proposed that global financial regulation should,
in the case of the United States, be elevated to the level of foreign relations law
and therefore subject to exceptionally deferential treatment by courts. 54 The
framework of global financial regulation and its relationship to administrative
law is discussed in more detail below.
D. Further Muddling in the International Environmental Law Context
It is often difficult to determine, especially as a matter of function, what truly
constitutes “hard” international law. Even where nations have entered into
formal legal instruments, such as treaties, the line between hard and soft law can
blur in many instances. Uncertainty of legal status is a recurring feature in
international environmental law, particularly with respect to the more prominent
treaties addressing climate change: the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris
Agreement. 55 This section explores these treaties and the nature of their
commitments in more detail. In doing so, it underscores the reality that formal
legal instruments nonetheless typically contain soft, non-binding elements. The
myriad of challenges involved in the treaty-making process are addressed
afterward.
The UNFCCC is considered a hard law instrument even though it effectively
provides no substantive binding commitments. Indeed, the UNFCCC is so broad
that it does not even identify specific greenhouse gasses or recommend specific
mitigation (or adaptation) procedures for countries to adopt to reduce climate
change emissions. Nonetheless, it is a binding, hard law instrument that was
ratified by the United States Senate, domestically. 56 As a “framework”
convention, this treaty leaves the setting and adoption of specific obligations to
subsequent agreements (which are typically characterized as “protocols”).

54
See Galbraith, supra note 26, at 764; See also David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The
Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998).
55
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38,
1771 U.N.T.S.; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10,
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162; Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
56
See generally, Harrold Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate International Agreements 128 YALE L.J.
432, 467 (2019). Unlike the Paris Agreement, which was entered into by Executive Agreement, the Trump
administration likely did not have the legal authority to unilaterally withdraw from the UNFCCC given that the
Senate approved it for ratification.
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Framework conventions are said to elevate political will for action and provide
flexibility by leaving room for consensus on details at a later stage. 57
The Kyoto Protocol—which the U.S. Senate ultimately failed to recommend
for ratification—is also broad, notwithstanding certain binding elements therein.
While the Kyoto Protocol, a follow-up to the UNFCCC, sets binding reduction
targets and timetables for certain developed countries, it fails to prescribe
specific mitigation actions. Moreover, despite the formality of an enforcement
mechanism in the treaty, sanctions under the Kyoto Protocol have proven
ineffective. 58 For example, Canada essentially went unsanctioned when it
announced it had no intention of complying with its commitments under the
agreement. 59 The lack of enforcieability of the Kyoto Protocol can be viewed as
particularly frustrating considering that the instrument took five years to
negotiate, and an additional seven years to enter into force.
The Paris Agreement, a follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol and its progeny,
formally entered into force in 2016, 4 days prior to the election of former
President Trump. This treaty has an even more mystifying legal status. The Paris
Agreement technically contains a mix of hard obligations, but only to the extent
that such commitments are limited to: procedural issues, issues of cooperation
and information exchange, and issues of interpretating its framework
convention, the UNFCCC. 60 In other words, the binding portions create no
additional substantive obligations on the parties beyond what was previously
agreed to in the previously discussed anemic UNFCCC. The treaty’s nationallydetermined contributions (“NDC”s), designed to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, are completely voluntary and therefore do not allow for any state-tostate enforcement under international law. 61 The treaty also fails to recommend
57
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE–THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND LAND MANAGEMENT,
Framework Convention Concept (Oct. 4, 2011), https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/sessions/docs2011/
informal.notice.5.pdf.
58
See David B. Hunter, The Hard Choice for Soft Commitments in the Climate Change Regime, in
ADVOCATING SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPLORING THE CHOICE BETWEEN HARD AND
SOFT INTERNATIONAL LAW (D. Bradlow & D. Hunter, ed., 2020) at 20–21 (“But experience with the Kyoto
Protocol implementation, as well as environmental agreements more generally, highlighted the shortcomings of
formal enforcement and sanctions in gaining compliance with binding targets”).
59
HUNTER, D., SALZMAN, J., ZAELKE, D. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, 74 ( 6th
ed. 2021).
60
See Harrold Koh, supra note 57, at 467, for a discussion on the legal standing of the Paris Agreement
in the United States, (“The 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement was not a sole executive agreement but what
some have called an executive agreement plus, a bundle of commitments made by executive initiative, but with
general congressional awareness and approval in a zone of significant congressional power”) (internal quotations
omitted).
61
See Salzman, supra note 60, at 74. The Obama negotiators could avoid the need for Senate ratification
only if any new mitigation commitments were non-binding.
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any specific mitigation or adaptation strategies. In its latest NDC report, Saudi
Arabia, the world’s second largest producer of fossil fuels, provided that it would
combat climate change solely by “support[ing] the planting of mangrove
seedlings along its coasts.” 62 Given such modest ambition from some nations, it
is perhaps no surprise that current NDCs, in the aggregate, fall far short of the
Paris Agreement’s aim to limit temperature increase to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius
above pre-industrial levels. 63 Additionally, the Paris Agreement does not have
an enforcement mechanism in place. While Article 15 of the Agreement directs
the Conference of the Parties to implement a means of enforcment, they have
still yet to do so.
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone is known as
the crown jewel of international environmental law. This treaty, as amended, has
led to the phase out of most ozone depleting success substances (“ODS”), such
as CFCs. Although it was not initially intended to address climate change, this
treaty has indirectly had the greatest positive impact on climate change. This is
primarily due to the fact that many ODS are also greenhouse gasses. 64
Nonetheless, while the Montreal Protocol provides for a binding enforcement
mechanism that includes trade measures, such measures have rarely, if ever,
been implemented. 65 The Implementation Committee has seldom recommended
revoking a nation’s access to technology and financial assistance under the
Multilateral Fund. In each case of noncompliance, the nation-party was able to
adopt corrective measures and avoid enforcement (i.e., sanctions). 66 Thus, even
among the more triumphant treaties in international environmental law,
enforcement procedures often boil down to informal mechanisms of soft law,
which will be explored in more detail below. 67
62
UNFCCC, The Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under
the UNFCCC (Nov. 2015), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Saudi%20Arabia%
20First/KSA-INDCs%20English.pdf.
63
See UNEP, UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2020, https://www.unep.org/emissions-gap-report-2020. As
things stand world is still heading for a temperature rise in excess of 3°C this century.
64
The more recent 2016 Kigali Amendment to the Protocol has further led to reduced greenhouse gas
emissions with the phase-down of certain CFC substitutes, namely HFCs.
65
See generally, NRDC v. EPA, 464 F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The legal status of certain aspects of the
Montreal is especially unclear with respect to whether decisions of the Committee of the Party, which
supplement and enforce certain obligations to the treaty, are binding. This question has been addressed in this
case. The Court ruled that EPA had no legal obligation to ensure that its rules for the production and consumption
of methyl bromide, an ozone depleting substance, complied with decisions for its use made by the Parties to the
Montreal Protocol.
66
Donald Goldberg et al., Effectiveness of Trade & Positive Measures in Multilateral Environmental
Agreements: Lessons from the Montreal Protocol, CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM, https://www.ciel.org/Publications/EffectivenessofTradeandPosMeasures.pdf.
67
See Center for Biodiversity v. United States, Memorandum Opinion, Civ. Action No. 18-563 (D.D.C.
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E. Soft Law’s de facto Enforcement Mechanisms
Contrary to conventional wisdom, soft law in the global financial regulation
context does have robust, albeit indirect, enforcement mechanisms. 68 Instances
of non-compliance with international standards, particularly in the case of
egregious deviations, can result in meaningful reputational and market costs.
First, entry into significant markets (e.g., U.S., UK, EU, Japan) require home
countries to meet the Basel Standards. Second, the IMF and World Bank
reference implementation of these standards as an indication of appropriate
domestic policy. Compliance with such standards is often the basis upon which
loans are granted by the IMF and the World Bank. In this sense, members can
use the lever of IMF and World Bank conditionality to induce compliance. 69
Financial institutions, such as the Basel Committee or the FSB, can also
publicly signal a member’s failure to comply with certain principles or
standards. This “name-and-shame” approach subjects a regulator or supervisor
to potential social opprobrium within a relatively small community should they
fail to deliver on certain commitments. Moreover, such ridicule signals that the
non-cooperative nation suffers from weak domestic oversight and supervision.
Targeted nations will in turn find it harder to raise capital or attract firms to
transact business in their countries; it is in their best financial interest to comply
with standards. 70 By way of specific example, the FSB has adopted measures to
promote compliance with international financial standards concerning
cooperation and information exchange. In doing so, the FSB provided that it can
consider a “toolbox of possible measures,” which include undesirable nameand-shame measures. 71

2019). Enforcement in other areas of international environmental law have been equally disappointing. As of
today, for example, the Conference of the Parties under the Rotterdam Convention (which entered into force in
2004) has still not agreed on a compliance mechanism. Moreover, in the case of the United States, even “hard”
(binding) commitments under the Paris Agreement cannot be enforced domestically. A lawsuit brought by the
Center for Biological Diversity to try to force the Trump Administration to comply with the treaty was dismissed
for a lack of standing.
68
See generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULEMAKING IN THE
21ST CENTURY (1st ed., 2011) (providing that global financial regulation is supported by a range of reputational,
market, and institutional mechanisms that make it more effective than traditional theories predict).
69
See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, supra note 24, at 1405 (“In sum, the current system based on . . . soft law
is relatively successful at enforcement cooperation”); see also Barr and Miller, Global Administrative Law: The
View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 20 (2006).
70
See Brummer, supra note 69, at 640–41.
71
FSB FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (Jan. 9, 2010),
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_100109a.pdf?page_moved=1.
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To summarize, in light of these broad and often non-binding elements of
hard law, coupled with non-existent or otherwise ineffective enforcement
mechanisms, one has to stretch their imagination to determine the functional
differences between hard and soft law at times. This line blurring may have
critical implications when one considers the unique features and concerns of
global finance as well as the challenges imposed by the treaty-making process,
both of which are discussed in more detail below.
III. THE PREVALENCE OF SOFT LAW AND UNIQUE FEATURES OF
GLOBAL FINANCE
Several explanations have been offered to explain the dominance of soft law
in international finance. This section first explores these theories and then
suggests why particular aspects of global finance warrant a soft law regime. In
doing so, I highlight the many pitfalls of using a treaty-based approach in the
global finance arena. The following section then contrasts the global financial
framework experience to that of international trade law.72
A. The Inefficiency of Hard Law
The ubiquity of informal agreements can be explained as the product of
power dynamics between countries. This “real-politik” perspective in
international relations posits that, in the absence of hard and binding
commitments, it is power rather than legal or efficiency considerations that
promotes the standard setting practice. 73 Informal, non-binding commitments
allow for easy exit and permit opportunism (in the form of free-riding) where it
benefits a particular nation. 74 However, given the increasingly transboundary
and interconnected nature of global finance and corollary systemic risk,
addressed earlier, powerful nations have a significant (perhaps the greatest)
incentive to build consensus and coordinate financial regulatory affairs with
other nations. The prevalence of soft law in global finance should therefore be
explained by more than power dynamics alone.

72
Not all financial regulators and supervisors have endorsed the soft law approach. See Comments
Received on ESB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: EFFECTIVE RESOLUTIONS OF S1FIS (July 19, 2011),
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_110719.pdf (Of the eight G-SIFIs that submitted comments to the
FSB, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Santander, UBS, and Unicredit expressly called for some form of legally
binding arrangement for resolution authority.
73
See Brummer, supra note 69, at 630–31.
74
Id.
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Soft law’s popularity can also be explained from the standpoint of efficiency
and reduced negotiation costs. 75 Under this theory, soft law not only seeks to
generate meaningful commitments from nations, but it also seeks to do so
efficiently. Hard law (and the treaty-making process in particular) is remarkably
unattractive in this regard. 76 With this in mind, the particular inefficiencies and
challenges involved in the treaty-making process deserve special mention.
As a preliminary matter, treaties typically originate in an informal manner.
For example, in the case of international environmental law, there is no
prescribed process for creating a multilateral treaty. Most often, a nation will
recommend that an international organization, such as the United Nations
General Assembly (“UNGA”) or the UN Economic and Social Council
(“ECOSOC”), establish a committee or convene an international conference to
consider a particular issue. Therefore in some respects, the nascent stages of the
treaty-making process resemble that of global financial regulation.
However, the treaty-making process then quickly begins to sing along to a
very different tune. First, treaty-making often entails years of negotiation
between heads of state and their representatives. 77 The Kyoto Protocol, for
instance, took five years alone to negotiate. Once negotiations have concluded
or the nation-parties have otherwise agreed to principal terms, treaties are then
subject to a cumbersome domestic ratification process. In the United States, for
example, legally binding instruments, irrespective of their hard or soft functions,
require significant support from the legislature—namely the advice and consent
of two-thirds of the Senate pursuant to the Treaty Clause of the Constitution. 78
After many years of negotiation, the U.S. ultimately rejected the Kyoto Protocol,
via the Bryd-Hagel resolution, by a unanimous 95-0 vote from the Senate. 79
Treaties are also subject to several qualifications and limitations. A
sovereign state may limit their consent to be bound by only a portion of a treaty.
In addition, states may be able to make formal reservations, which can make the
75
See Verdier, supra note 24, at 1459, providing that political economy considerations explain the
prevalence of soft law (“there are strong historical and political factors that favor soft law . . . and hinder the
emergence of other arrangements”).
76
Brummer, supra note 69, at n.73.
77
Id.
78
A congressional-executive agreement requires approval from a majority of both Houses of Congress.
However, as discussed supra note 56, the President has acted unilaterally where a treaty binds the nation only to
soft law commitments. This was the approach the Obama and Biden administrations took with respect to entering
(and re-entering) the Paris Agreement. This then begs the question of whether such a formal process is worth
the costs; See also Galbraith and Zaring, supra note 26, at 749.
79
Interestingly, the US failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol because of the instrument’s lack of
commitments from developing countries, which is addressed below, in the context of global finance.
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implementation and application of treaties more complex and challenging. 80 The
number of reservations in treaties has risen dramatically over the last several
decades. This rise is attributed to the growing number of nations and increasing
public political pressure. Even where a party cannot or has not made a formal
reservation or otherwise limited its consent to be bound, it may nonetheless
provide a broad “declaration” to the treaty. While in theory declarations merely
clarify the nation’s position and do not modify the legal effect of the treaty, they
nonetheless open the door to further ambiguity. Consider, by way of example,
the following excerpt from the Philippines’ declaration to the Paris Agreement:
It is the understanding of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines that its accession to and the implementation of the Paris
Agreement shall in no way constitute a renunciation of rights under
any local and international laws or treaties, including those concerning
State responsibility for loss and damage associated with the adverse
effects of climate change.

Declarations such as these shed light on the nuances of a cumbersome process.
They also, perhaps more significantly, raise difficult questions about the
applicability of treaty obligations vis-à-vis public international law more
generally. 81 In this example, the Philippines is ex ante identifying its potential
defenses under international (and national) law for non-compliance with its
obligations under the treaty. 82 Such disclaimers are especially curious in the case
of the Paris Agreement, which, as we observed earlier, fails to provide for any
substantive binding commitments to begin with.
The hurdles to effectuate and implement a treaty do not merely stop at the
ratification process. 83 To echo the mantra of infomercials, “but wait, there’s
more!” The parties to a treaty are not legally bound by its terms until the treaty
“enters into force.” Most often the treaty will enter into force only after a certain
minimum number of nations have ratified the agreement domestically and
additional conditions or “triggers” have been satisfied. As noted earlier, the
See Salzman, supra note 60, at 302.
Even in the absence of a formal treaty obligation, customary international law (a form of hard law),
provides a myriad of defenses and exceptions to meeting international obligations. This is another example of
how hard law is riddled with ambiguity with respect to both its obligations and compliance mechanisms; see
Zaring, supra note 35, at 208 (“In any particular time and, indeed, in particularly important times, powerful
states may break their legal obligations in the interests of their national security or other national priorities.”);
see also Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. (2000).
82
This should, perhaps more accurately, be referred to as a “preclusion from wrongfulness” in custonary
international law parlance.
83
Additional, minor requirements such as “depositing” the instrument with the appropriate depository
are fairly easy to satisfy. Treaties are often ratified and deposited on the same day.
80
81
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Kyoto Protocol took approximately seven years to enter into force. Below is an
excerpt from the Kyoto Protocol’s demanding Entry into Force clause (Article
25).
This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date
on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating
Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per
cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties
included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession.

To summarize, treaties and other sources of hard law are subject to many of the
same ambiguities and putative limitations of soft law. Indeed, as previously
observed, the boundary between hard and soft law is often unclear. While they
are technically hard law instruments, most of the climate change agreements
provide no specific (e.g., quantitative) commitments, action-plans, or
recommendations as to how to reduce green-house gas (“GHG”) admissions.
The difficulty in obtaining consensus (or “buy in”) among nations—resulting,
in part, from their fears over the consequences of noncompliance—has arguably
led to a process wherein the parties agree on the lowest common-denominator. 84
Moreover, such hard law instruments appear to confer no meaningful advantage
in terms of enforcement mechanisms. As will be continued in discussion, the
informal “name-and-shame” compliance tools of global financial regulation can
be especially effective. 85 Furthermore, the formal requirements of hard law,
namely the ratification and entry into force requirements of treaties, make this
form of law exceptionally time-consuming and inefficient. 86 While the Montreal
84
See Susan Biniaz, Comma but Differentiated Responsibilities: Punctuation and 30 Other Ways
Negotiators Have Resolved Issues in the International Climate Change Regime, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L.
37 (2016). (Revealing that treaty negotiators often deliberately create “constructive ambiguity” for interpretive
purposes as vagueness and imprecision facilitates consensus); See also Salzman, supra note 60, at 106 (“Some
commentators argue that the United Nations is the wrong forum for negotiating a response to climate change,
asserting that the rule of decision by consensus makes it difficult to reach agreement on broad and complex
issues.”).
85
See Piotr Bańbula and Malgorzata Iwanicz-Drozdowska,The Systemic Importance of Banks–Name and
Shame Seems to Work, 18 FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS, ELSEVIER, 297 (Aug., 2016) (analyzing the impact of
announcements of the list of GSIFIs by the FSB and finding that the announcement itself decreased the systemic
importance of these institutions by approximately 25 percent); cf Edward F. Greene and Joshua L. Boehm, The
Limits of Name-and-Shame in International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083 (2012); The
European Banking Authority is currently in the process of creating a database to name-and-shame financial
institutions with weak anti-money laundering controls. See generally EBA REGULATION AND POLICY,
https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism.
86
Cf. ALEXANDER KERN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SOFT LAW AND THE FORMATION OF BINDING
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION (2005), (“A multilateral treaty framework may be necessary to ensure
that most states that regulate the major financial systems adhere to accepted principles of capital adequacy,
payment system regulation, and antimoney-laundering requirements”).
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Protocol has proven to be an undeniable success story of hard law, the climate
agreements have, to date, been a disappointment at best, and a failure at worst.
B. The Dynamism and Complexity of Global Finance
The inefficiency of the treaty-making process is eminently noteworthy when
one considers the peculiar nature of global finance and systemic risk. First and
foremost, global finance is an extremely technical area of regulation, requiring
expert, technocratic decision-making at all levels. Interlinkages among financial
systems, coupled with the transboundary nature of global finance, necessitate an
interdisciplinary approach covering, among other areas, expertise in finance,
macroeconomics, banking regulation, securities regulation, corporate
governance, and bankruptcy. 87 This expectation is especially salient following
the lessons learned from the global financial crisis. A macroprudential approach
to preventing and containing systemic risk focuses on risks across the entire
financial system rather than to specific institutions. The importance of linedrawing between traditional banks, and other financial intermediaries (namely,
shadow banks) and financial markets has waned over time. Given these
considerations and many others, it is hard to imagine a well-functioning
regulatory system in which less experienced heads of state (or representatives
thereof), rather than specialized regulators and supervisors, devise best
practices. 88 Indeed, in the case of the United States, a similar dynamic should
raise the question of whether the highly-qualified Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) rather than the State Department is better suited to coordinate
standards in the context of international environmental law, or at least should be
consulted more.
Moreover, when it comes to global finance, perhaps moreso than any other
area of law or regulation, time is of the essence. 89 As Armour et al. eloquently
put it:
The financial system does more than simply keep capital flowing
round the economy today. It is also a time machine, linking the
economy of today to the economy of tomorrow. That is a Herculean
87
For example, the FSB key attributes concerning resolution authority would require a sophisticated
understanding of insolvency and bankruptcy law. The “no creditor worse-off than in liquidation” rule
underscores this point.
88
An exception perhaps being the G-20, an intergovernmental forum comprising 19 countries and the
European Union, which includes heads of state in addition to central bankers and finance ministers. See generally
G-20, https://www.g20.org.
89
The notion of fractional reserve banking, the lifeblood of banking finance, depends on proper timing
assumptions. Too many deposit withdrawals at once—baring certain safeguards such as insurance—cannot be
satisfied due to liquidity mismatch.
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task and it demands a measure of sophistication that is the source of
both its successes and failures. 90

Financial regulators are often one step (or several steps) behind the financial
industry. The financial regulation literature frequently emphasizes this temporal
shortcoming as one of the primary causes of financial crises. 91 Therefore, for
obvious reasons, treaties cannot keep up with systems in which automated stock
market transactions are executed at lightning speed and payments are cleared
and settled in real time or within 24-hours. 92 Financial intermediaries are
constantly innovating novel products, vehicles for investment, and investment
strategies that quickly take hold in the mainstream financial system. 93 Some of
these have the potential to transmit risk and destabilize the entire global financial
system. Financial innovation in derivatives, such as the creation credit default
swaps, contributed to the short-term credit-supply run on the shadow banking
system, which ultimately precipitated the global financial crisis. 94
The 1974 Herstatt Bank failure, which itself led to the creation of the Basel
Committee, provides a prime example of time-sensitivity considerations in
international finance. The German bank incurred sizeable losses in fast-paced
foreign exchange trading. The operations of the bank were then suspended in the
middle of a foreign currency exchange transaction. Those entities that
transferred currency to Herstatt Bank (deutschmarks) never received the agreed
upon exchange currency (US dollars). This in turn led regulators to soon develop
and implement the use of the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS). 95 In short,
even minor delay and regulatory foot-dragging in global finance is a potential
recipe for disaster.
The temporal dimension of global finance has both significant ex ante and
ex post implications in regulatory design. More recent resolution mechanisms,
90
91

(2017).

Armour, supra note 3, at 22.
Ralph Chami et al., Financial Regulation and the Speed of Financial Risks, 7-2 OECONOMIA 161,

92
Brummer, supra note 69, at 637 (“financial markets are constantly evolving due either to innovations
in the trading strategies or technological capabilities of market participants, and because of the changing
macroeconomic and regulatory environment in which markets operate.”).
93
Additional technological expertise will be necessary as crypto currency and alternative, electronic
clearing and settlement systems continue to develop and popularize.
94
See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (January 2011) (Conclusion,
pp. xv–xxviii); see also Lastra, Rosa & Wood, Geoffrey, The Crisis of 2007—09: Nature, Causes, and Reactions,
13 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 531 (2010).
95
This occurred after the German bank incurred sizeable losses in fast-paced foreign exchange trading.
The operations of the bank were suspended in the middle of a foreign currency exchange transaction. Those
entities that transferred currency to Herstatt Bank (deutschmarks) never received the agreed upon exchange
currency (US dollars).
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referenced earlier, are intended to operate more quickly than ordinary insolvency
laws to mitigate severe loss of value in the event of bank failure. 96 Resolution
mechanisms call for the use of new tools such as asset transfer and “bail-in”
creditor financed recapitalization. These tools are intended to be implemented
swiftly to prevent insolvency or bankruptcy. 97 Under the FSB Key Attributes,
the resolution authority can stay an institution’s obligations (e.g., implement a
24-hour stay of OTC derivatives and the triggering of any liquidation
preferences) to transfer its book of assets to another financial institution. Swift
action is also necessary ex post, following the onset of a crisis. Freixas et al. note
that “a speedy resolution of the crisis is of the essence, even if accompanies by
high fiscal outlays to support the financial section.” 98 The small and fairly
homogenous makeup of global financial regulators and supervisors, such as the
Basel Committee (as opposed to a diverse group of politicians, state officials or
ambassadors) allows the group to respond quickly and act flexibly. 99
The global financial regulatory framework’s swift reaction to the Covid-19
pandemic is perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of soft law in this area.
As of the time of this paper, the ultimate consequences of the pandemic remain
uncertain. Notwithstanding, regulators have been able to respond to this new
shock to the global financial system in an impressive timely fashion. On April
10, 2020—while many jurisdictions around the world were still in quarantine—
the FSB outlined its plan for coordinated action to maintain financial stability
and support the real economy. Such measures included: identifying vulnerable
nodes in the global financial system, promoting daily information exchanges on
financial policy responses taken by FSB members, and guiding domestic
authorities on ways to use the existing flexibility 100 in international standards to
address the crisis. 101 The Covid-19 pandemic has also (arguably) revealed that
Basel III has, to date, achieved its ongoing objective of strengthening the
resilience of the banking system. 102
Armour, supra note 3, at 78.
G-SIFIs are subject to the FSB key attributes covering resolution scope, authority, and powers.
98
See FREXIAS ET. AL, supra note 8, at 146.
99
Barr and Miller, supra note 70, at 18.
100
In the United States, the Federal Reserve did not extend a pandemic-crisis rule that allowed banks to
relax capital levels. See generally FEDERAL RESERVE, COVID-19 Supervisory and Regulatory FAQs, https://
www.federalreserve.gov/covid-19-supervisory-regulatory-faqs.htm.
101
FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD. Letter to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors: April
2020, https://www.fsb.org/2020/04/fsb-chairs-letter-to-g20-finance-ministers-and-central-bank-governors-april-2020/;
see also FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, COVID-19 pandemic: Financial stability implications and policy measures taken –
Report to the G20 on July 5, 2020, https://www.fsb.org/2020/07/covid-19-pandemic-financial-stability-implications-andpolicy-measures-taken-report-to-the-g20/.
102
See Pablo Hernandez de Cos, Chairman of the Basel Committee, Speech at the BCBS-BundesbankCEPR workshop on evaluating financial regulation: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Basel III during Covid-19
96
97
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In addition to time-sensitivity considerations, soft law in the global finance
context promotes the independence of central banks. Central banks are designed
with the intent to be largely insulated from domestic politics. In the United
States, for example, presidential control over the Federal Reserve Board is
asserted at the time of nomination of the Chairman and Board Members. After
full board and chairman approval, this control effectively detaches in the interest
of preserving the Board’s independence and credibility in the market. 103 While
Congress does exert some control over the Federal Reserve Board during the
confirmation process and at periodic hearings on banking and monetary policy,
the Reserve Board is independently funded through interest earned on its
security holdings, meaning the Board is financially politically independent. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) is also independently funded
through fees paid by banks. 104 According to Barr and Miller, “independence [of
central bankers] tends to promote stability in monetary policy.” 105 Here again,
the wisdom behind the Basel Committee’s “club” of central bankers (and other
regulators) may offer more benefit than ordinarily meets the eye.
Lastly, no two countries are the same. Even among developed nations, states
have vastly different economies, financial system architectures, path
dependencies, and political and social agendas. 106 Soft law’s flexibility accounts
for this variation and allows countries to narrowly tailor regulation to their
particular needs. 107 For examply, the United States, as a liberal market-based
economy, has a significantly lower percentage of assets as a percentage of GDP,
in comparison to Switzerland, a nation that is heavily dependent on bank
financing. In addition to financing sources, nations have diverse financial system
architectures, ranging from systems that integrate all prudential regulation to
those that have implemented twin (or triple) peak structures. 108 In the United
and Beyond, (Apr. 20, 2021).
103
Barr and Miller, supra note 70, at 18.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 19.
106
See Chris Brummer, How International Law Works (and How it Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 327 (2011).
In case of global finance, a centralized regulatory system is impractical due to incongruent domestic forms of
prudential and supervisory oversight.
107
The United States, for example, chose to develop a “bifurcated regulatory capital framework” under
which most banks could continue to apply a modified version of Basel I, while the largest internationally active
banks would apply the advanced internal ratings based approach developed under Basel II; See Bradley K. Sabel,
Basel III Framework: US/EU Comparison, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(Sept. 27, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/27/basel-iii-framework-useu-comparison (Highlighting US
and EU differences in Basel III implementation); See also Christian Tietje &Matthias Lehmann, The Role and
Prospects of International Law in Financial Regulation and Supervision, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 663 (Sept. 2010)
(there is no “one size fits all approach” to financial regulation and supervision).
108
Llewellyn, supra note 25 at 42 (“International experience indicates a wide variety of institutional
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States, for instance, banking supervision is stratified at the federal level among
the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 109 According to Barr and Miller,
variation can lead to wider reach among nations and enhance the legitimacy of
the standards, a concept that will be explored in more detail below. 110 As we’ve
seen, the (perhaps illusory) promise of harmonization in the hard law context
has led nations to agree on deflated commitments. Conversely, the flexibility of
soft law has had an arguably far more positive impact with respect to the
implementation of global financial standards.
C. Sovereignty Costs and Global Financial Regulation
Global financial standards are set by non-elected, supranational networks of
regulators. Some have characterized this regime as a club of regulatory
technocrats lacking in accountability and legitimacy. Others have even
described the framework as “anti-US.” 111 Perhaps ironically, however, it is the
non-binding, elastic character of global financial regulation that allows nations
to reduce sovereignty costs. 112 One of the greatest challenges in international
law is the increasing tension between the ideal of state sovereignty and the
notion of international harmonization based on law. The principle of state
sovereignty demands that nations maintain the ultimate authority to govern their
citizens according to national values. States, however, routinely make binding,
legal commitments that either conflict with or surrender this power.113 As
observed earlier, this tension has arguably led to watered-down obligations in
the framework of international environmental law treaties addressing climate
change. This sovereignty tension (or “democracy deficit”) is also manifest—and
indeed intensifying—in other domains of public international law. In the area of
international investment arbitration, for example, troves of nations, including
have either terminated or replaced their bilateral and multilateral treaties as a

regulatory formats which suggests there is no universal ideal model”).
109
Interestingly, some agencies have been more receptive to the Basel Committee than others. Barr and
Miller, supra note 70, point out that the Federal Reserve has been more supportive of the Committee’s
substantive decisions than has the OCC.
110
See Barr and Miller, supra note 70, at 31.
111
Tom Braithwaite & Patrick Jenkins, JPMorgan Chief Says Bank Rules ‘Anti-US,’ FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), (Sept. 12, 2011); see Barr and Miller, supra note 70, footnote 103.
112
See generally Chris Brummer, Networks In (-)Action? The Transgovernmental Origins of, and
Responses to, the Financial Crisis,3 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REV., 323 (2012) (finding perceived sovereignty
costs associated with strict standards limit international coordination).
113
See Hathaway, Oona A., International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 L.& CONTEMP. Probs 71,
115 (2008).
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reclamation of national sovereignty. 114 The non-binding and flexible nature of
global financial regulation mitigates this tension for the same reasons previously
discussed—states are not (at least as a formal matter) legally bound by any of
these commitments and are free to tailor international standards according to
their specific domestic needs. Soft law also depends on domestic approval
(typically regulatory) for its domestic enforcement. Finally, as will be seen
below, the adoption of certain global administrative law mechanisms can (and
has) led to increased accountability and legitimacy of global financial
regulation. 115
IV. WTO LAW’S EXPERIENCE AND ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
While a full assessment of the criticisms of the current state of global
financial regulation is beyond the scope of this paper, this section responds to
some of these concerns to the extent not previously addressed. 116 Specifically,
this section briefly addresses the experience of the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) and its dispute settlement function, the advent of administrative law
mechanisms in global financial regulation, and the potential need for increased
participation from developing nations in the framework of global financial
regulation.
A. WTO Law Experience
Some have argued that global financial regulation should follow the WTO
model. 117 This proposes, in essence, the creation of a “WFO” to complement the
114
See G. Dimitropoulos, National Sovereignty and International Investment Law: Sovereignty
Reassertion and Prospects of Reform, 21 J. OF WORLD INV. & TRADE, 71, (2020).
115
See Howse, Robert, How to Begin to Think About the Democratic Deficit at the WTO, in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (S. Griller (ed., 2003).
116
Many academics have cited subpar regulation as a contributing factor to the global financial crisis of
2007–08. See, e.g., Rosa Lastra & Geoffrey Wood, The Crisis of 2007—09: Nature, Causes, and Reactions, 13
J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 531 (2010). This paper does not disagree with this conclusion for reasons previously
addressed, e.g., the lack of macroprudential focus on systemic risk (particularly with respect to liquidity risk),
the failure to adequately regulate shadow banking, and so on. It is important to emphasize, however, that a
shortcoming in regulatory scope or ambition is different than a deficiency in the form of the regulatory
framework (i.e. hard versus soft law). The Covid-19 experience thus far is a testament to dynamism,
responsiveness, and resiliency of soft law.
117
See, e.g., R. Michael Gadbaw, Systemic Regulation of Global Trade and Finance: A Tale of Two
Systems, 13 J. OF INT’L ECON. L., 551 (2010) (suggesting the global financial regulatory framework should more
closely resemble the WTO); See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 ( Apr. 15, 1994); see Barbara C. Matthews, Emerging Public International
Banking Law? Lessons from the Law of the Sea Experience, 10 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. (2010), an analysis comparing
global financial regulation to the hard law experience of the Law of the Sea.
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WTO. This argument is misguided for several reasons. First, in addition to the
singular features and attributes of global finance, discussed previously, financial
regulation and trade law have starkly different goals. The primary goal of the
WTO is to foster trade liberalization, while global financial regulation aims to,
among other things, prevent and contain systemic risk. These goals are not only
distinct from one another but can also be in tension in many respects. Recall,
pro-liberalization efforts to embrace global trade in the 1970s and 1980s and the
preeminence of the US dollar as the primary international reserve currency
encouraged competition and innovative financial products that, in turn, created
systemic risks. 118
Moreover, the WTO is by no means a success story, particularly given the
current state of its Appellate Body. The WTO’s Appellate Body is a critical
element of the institution’s dispute settlement function to adjudicate trade
disputes. It hears appeals from reports issued by panels in disputes raised by
WTO members. As of today, the WTO’s dispute settlement function is at risk of
collapsing. The United States, through both the Trump and Biden
Administrations, has continuously blocked the appointment of new judges to the
Appellate Body due to complaints over judicial activism and related concerns
over sovereignty. 119 The dispute settlement system has effectively grinded to a
halt. This dysfunction has cast doubt on the WTO’s authority to enforce
multilateral trade rules. The WTO’s dispute settlement is another illustration of
the increased sovereignty costs imposed by hard law. The WTO framework,
particularly its binding nature, competes with a number of domestic national
values in various countries. As such, it may be no surprise if additional countries
begin to challenge the WTO’s legitimacy by advocating the fundamental
sovereign right to choose their own level protection on national security,
environmental, domestic self-sufficiency, health emergency, or moral grounds,
led by example by the United States. 120

118
In addition, the WTO’s aim to promote trade liberalization, by granting concessions and removing
other barriers to trade, while justified under an economic theory of trade, can lead to adverse distributional
effects. In this sense, global financial regulation may further diverge from trade law to the extent the latter
(better) addresses issues of inequality and fairness.
119
Bryce Baschuk, Biden Picks up where Trump Left off in Hard-Line Stances at WTO, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-22/biden-picks-up-where-trump-left-off-in-hardline-stances-at-wto.
120
As a general matter, a dispute mechanism system appears far less useful in a regulatory regime that is
defined to promote financial stability. Conversely, feuds between trading partners are common and arguably
need a resolution mechanism; see William J. Gardner Jr., Divergent Strategies: A Legal History of the WTO’s
National Security Exception in the Context of a Globalized Economy, 1983–2019, 28 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 181 (2021).
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Furthermore, the WTO’s aim to promote trade liberalization by granting
concessions and removing other barriers to trade, while perhaps justified under
an economic theory of trade, can lead to adverse distributional effects. In this
sense, global financial regulation may further diverge from trade law to the
extent the former strives to address issues of inequality and fairness. While trade
liberalization can lead to greater total welfare, it will invariably create winners
and losers. Indeed, many economists have underappreciated the distributional
effects caused by free trade, which can lead to the destruction of entire
industries. 121 This distributional oversight is heightened by the fact that the
WTO system—even with a properly functioning dispute resolution system—
only enforces prospective remedies (e.g., balance of payments or countervailing
duties) that do not benefit the harmed industry. 122
In short, the fact that both the WTO and framework of global financial
regulation address economic issues in no way means they should be treated the
same. These areas of law serve different functions, and can even be at odds with
one another in some respects. The WTO experience also underscores hard law’s
increased sovereignty dilemma and related enforcement challenges.
B. Global Administrative Law and Increased Participation from the Global
South
This paper has emphasized the many benefits of soft law in the global
finance arena, including its efficiency, flexibility, and lower sovereignty costs.
Despite these advantages, there may be room for improvement within the
framework of global financial regulation. In fact, the current state of limbo of
the WTO’s Appellate Body should caution rather than embolden the
international network of financial regulators and supervisors. Accordingly,
additional reforms may have to be instituted to preserve the long-term stability
of this area of soft law. If the primary goal of financial regulation is to maintain
financial stability, then the stability and legitimacy of the institutions
themselves, charged with this monumental task, is paramount.

121

(2017).

See Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 985

122
WTO enforcement mechanisms, even with a properly functioning Appellate Body, suffer from
additional flaws. The remedy of authorized retaliation leads to lower liberalization as more barriers to trade are
imposed. In addition, member nations are not necessarily obligated to perform in accordance with WTO rulings.
The European Union has, for decades now, endured monetary retaliation from the United States in response to
its continued ban on meat treated with hormones. See ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN & MARK A. POLLACK,
TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES: THE EU, THE US, AND THE WTO, at 223 (2003).
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As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the network of global
financial regulators (the Basel Committee in particular) has become more
transparent and accountable over time. International financial institutions have
adopted significant structural changes and reforms to increase their legitimacy
and accountability, including notice-and-comment processes to provide those
not involved in the decision‐making process with an opportunity to contribute
and voice suggestions and concerns. These measures have comprised the nascent
elements of what some have termed “global administrative law.”123 The Basel
II standards, for example, involved extensive processes to increase public
participation, transparency of its processes, and input from developing
countries. 124 Basel III resulted in further advances in its processes, including
increased openness and monitoring of its implementation. 125 The Committee
posted the proposed Basel III standards on its website and encouraged feedback
and comments from the public and interested parties. Following opportunities
for comment, the Committee then provided reasons for any revised drafts of the
standards. 126
The foregoing improvements notwithstanding, several policy reforms have
been proposed. These reforms include implementing more robust monitoring
functions, including making compliance with global inspection and surveillance
processes mandatory, as well as making the information obtained from such
monitoring more available to investors 127 Others have advocated for greater
participation from developing countries beyond mere input on consultative
groups, especially given IMF and World Bank financing conditionality. Kern et
al., for example, have argued that while soft law has served as a flexible
mechanism to develop international norms and standards of banking regulation,
123
Id.; Interestingly, global administrative law measures, such as transparency and notice and comment
mechanisms not only enhance legitimacy but also facilitate information sharing between domestic regulators
and global networks, which can lead to better market discipline and rulemaking; Moreover, global administrative
law mechanisms at the national and global level are mutually reinforcing. The domestic process can improve
transparency in the global standard-setting process, and vice versa. See generally Benedict Kingsbury et al., The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
124
See Barr and Miller, supra note 70, at 45.
125
See James Gallagher, Global Administrative Law: The Basel Committee Revisited, (2015) (LLM
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington) at 9 (Discussing Basel III’s Regulatory Consistency
Assessment Programme (RCAP)).
126
Id.
127
See Brummer, supra note 69, at 642; See Christine Kaufmann & Rolf Weber, The Role of Transparency
in Financial Regulation, 13 J. OF INT’L ECON, L. 13. 779 (2010) (“Transparency is a prerequisite for good
governance and sound financial regulation . . . By providing legal certainty, transparency serves as an anchor for
financial regulation. It is the basis for establishing trust, which is the key element of any financial system.”); See
also Steve Charnovitz, Addressing Government Failure Through International Financial Law, 13 J. OF INT’L &
ECON. L. 743 (2011) (discussing the significance of transparency in global financial regulation).

ALEEM_6.9.22

2022]

6/13/2022 2:52 PM

SOFT LAW

27

a greater number of countries will need to participate in international standard
setting to ensure accountability and legitimization. 128 Basel Committee meetings
are generally only attended by central bank governors of G20 nations, to the
exclusion of developing nations who may nonetheless be impacted by the
Committee’s decisions. In fact, according to Grynberg and Silva, such meetings
are “are increasingly focused on emerging‐market developments [but] the
perspective is that of the impact on G‐10 economies.” 129 The Global South is
therefore expected to comply with these decisions without a seat at the table. For
these reasons, expanded membership to developing nations in key standardsetting bodies, allowing for more meaningful participation, should be introduced
in the near future.
CONCLUSION
Robust financial regulation is critical given the inherent fragility of financial
systems and the consequential systemic risks and costs they impose, particularly
to the most vulnerable (and least culpable) sectors of society. Such regulation
must be coordinated on an international level given the increasingly
transboundary nature of financial systems, the cross-border spillover effects of
financial risk and contagion, and the potential for powerful financial
intermediaries to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Soft law is the optimal form of
regulation for global finance given its unique features and attributes—namely
its complexity and dynamism. Soft law’s flexibility and non-binding character
make it particularly well-suited for the regulation of global finance given timesensitivity and sovereignty considerations, the variety of domestic regulatory
and supervisory architectures, and the need for central bank independence. The
treaty framework can be extremely inefficient and ineffective, as evidenced by
the international environmental law experience and other areas of public
international law. While there is surely room for improvement in this promising
area of soft law, the current state of the WTO and its dispute resolution
mechanism should serve more as a warning than a guidepost.

128
See KERN ALEXANDER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SOFT LAW AND THE FORMATION OF BINDING INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION, at 135–54 (2005) (Suggesting that the process through which these standards have
been promulgated and implemented under IMF and World Bank supervision raises issues of political legitimacy
and accountability).
129
See also Roman Grynberg & Sacha Silva, Harmonization without Representation: Small States, the
Basel Committee, and the WTO, 34 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 7 at 1225 (2006).

